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The Cypriot banking crisis shows that Europeans have yet to
work out the answer to the question, ‘who pays?’
by Blog Admin
The past week has been a tumultuous one for Cyprus, with negotiations and renegotiations
towards a bailout for the country’s embattled banks. While an agreement has finally been
struck, Iain Begg writes that the crisis is a direct result of an over-extended banking system:
something that also affects other Eurozone members. The solution, to make bank depositors
pay, could undermine confidence in the Eurozone’s banking system.
Who pays? That is the crit ical question about how to cope with the problems af f ecting
Cyprus. Indeed, it has been the question behind every phase of  the crisis which has
engulf ed the euro area since the holes in Greek public f inances were exposed in the autumn of  2009. Now,
the contest to avoid being lef t f acing the bill largely explains why Europe’s polit icians have f ound it so hard
to resolve the crisis.
The range of  options is limited. Bank shareholders are usually f irst to pay, then bondholders may be
expected to lose some of  the nominal value of  their holding – what is known as taking a ‘haircut’. If  that is
not enough, then banks turn to governments and central banks, ef f ectively shif t ing the burden to tax-
payers, whether in the country directly af f ected or in other countries. Loans f rom European partners, the
IMF or elsewhere amount to the taxpayers of  other countries assuming the risk that the bad debts of  the
country in trouble or its banks will not be paid.
So f ar, however, depositors in banks have mostly been protected f rom sharing the burden of  dealing with a
banking crisis. The main reason f or this protection is that policy-makers have been concerned to avoid
creating panic that could lead to systemic problems in the banking system as a whole. The f ear is that if
depositors lose conf idence, the entire banking system would be at risk.
Cyprus is the latest in a string of
countries that have had to conf ront
the meltdown of  a severely over-
extended banking system. With bank
assets estimated at a multiple of  eight
times GDP, Cyprus is a small country
f or which the banking system grew f ar
too much. Like Iceland and Ireland a
f ew years ago, Cypriot banks had
welcomed depositors f rom abroad and
of f ered them attractive terms. In the
good times, this was mutually
benef icial. Depositors obtained better
returns – and limited scrutiny of  the
sources of  their money – while the
Cypriot authorit ies happily imposed
low tax rates which, because of  the
sheer scale of  the deposits, enabled
them to collect large tax revenues.
The problem was what the Cypriot banks did with the money which was, at least in part, to lend to the
Greek government. As a result, when Greek sovereign bonds collapsed in value and investors were required
to take a ‘haircut’ , the Cypriot banks suddenly had a large hole in their balance sheets. Because of  the
scale of  the problem, the Cypriot government lacked the means to rescue the banks as has happened in
larger countries such as the UK (or even the US), and was f orced to turn to its European partners f or a
bail-out.
While the sequence has become depressingly f amiliar, Cyprus has a number of  f eatures which make
resolution of  the crisis harder. First, there was an extended period of  denial. The outgoing President of  the
country, knowing that elections were due in February 2013, managed to put-of f  dealing with the simmering
crisis to avoid being blamed f or harsh policies. This procrastination helps to explain why the European
Central Bank, despite its President’s announcement that he would do what it takes to saf eguard the euro,
has been threatening to cut of f  the f low of  liquidity to the banks. Nicos Anastasiades, who only took of f ice
f our weeks ago, was theref ore immediately conf ronted with a rapidly worsening problem.
A second distinctive f eature in Cyprus is that the retail depositors are the principal creditors of  the banks,
with much smaller involvement of  bond-holders than in, f or example, Ireland. Even wiping out the
bondholders would not have been enough to raise the amount of  money demanded by both IMF and the
Eurogroup as the Cypriot share of  the burden,
Third, as has been well-publicised, a large proportion of  the f oreign money in the Cypriot banking system is
Russian owned. Some of  that Russian money is widely believed to belong to organised crime syndicates
and even some of  the legit imate money is there because the depositors are trying to hide their money f rom
the Russian authorit ies. To German eyes, this looks like tax evasion, and makes it that much harder to
justif y using the tax euros of  honest Northern Europeans to resolve the crisis.
In addition, at just 0.2 per cent of  the Eurozone economy, Cyprus is probably not big enough to have
consequences f or other euro area countries. Even a substantial def ault would have only limited
repercussions f or the other vulnerable countries, although Europe’s leaders would do well to remember the
law of  unintended consequences. There were those, af ter all, who thought that there were f ew systemic
risks in lett ing Lehman Brothers go bust in 2008.
In the games of  bluf f  and counter-bluf f  that have been going on as the Cyprus saga unf olds, some of  the
proposals around who should pay have clearly been misguided. The init ial plan to levy a tax on all
depositors was guaranteed to draw opposition – and duly did. It could have led to the absurd situation
where the lif e-savings of  a grandmother with 10 thousand euros in her account attracted the same tax as a
Russian oligarch with the same amount of  money in his account to pay f or the f uel f or his private yacht.
It also became apparent that the Cypriot authorit ies wrongly believed that the Germans and the other
northern Europeans would ult imately pay. However, the evident exasperation of  the ECB and of  such
inf luential f inance ministers as Germany’s Wolf gang Schäuble should have been a warning to them. There
is, too, moral unease about a Cypriot economic model so reliant on of f shore banking.
The Cyprus problem will leave a number of  legacies f or the euro area. One is that depositors, who have
been comprehensively protected up to now, can no longer assume that they will not be asked to pay,
something that may shake conf idence in other banking systems. Another is that a Europe-wide bank
resolution mechanism is urgently needed. But perhaps most f undamentally, Europeans need to work out
how to answer the ‘who pays?’ question, not just in relation to f ailing banks, but as a key element of
European integration.
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